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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
JAMES KOROBAS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JAMES A. HENDERSON, 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case 
No. 8636 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts in appel-
lant's brief with the exception of the sentence stating, ((The 
court also decided, as a matter of law, which defects were 
latent." (Appellant's Brief, page 5.) The court merely at-
tempted to set out which defects would be in issue at the 
trial. In doing so the court did exclude from issue any defects 
which were so obviously patent that no reasonable juror could 
ever hold them to be otherwise. The court did leave in issue 
any defects where evidence might show them to be latent 
rather than patent (R. 39, 40, 43). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court's interpretation of paragraph 15 of the con-
tract was correct. 
2. The court did not err in ruling that certain defects were 
patent and others latent. 
3. The court did not err in failing to award an attorney's 
fee to plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The court} s interpretation of paragraph 15 of the con-
tract was correct. 
Appellant contends that paragraph 15 of their contract 
prohibits claims for wrongful acts and neglects if not brought 
\vithin a specified time, but does not affect claims for failure 
to perforn1 the work required by the contract or for performing 
it otherwise than as required by the contract (Appellant's 
Brief, page 6.) Appellant relies upon the definitions of Hreim-
bursement," ttwrong" and nneglect" to show this paragraph 
applies to claims in the nature of a tort, rather than contract. 
In so arguing, appellant has overlooked both grammatical 
construction and the general.proposition of the paragraph. 
The first phrase of paragraph 15 states: ttl£ either party to 
the contract shall suffer dttnlage in any 1nanner ... -··· 
1 n the first sentence of his brief appellant tells us, nit 
is eletnentary that a cause of action for dantages arises upon 
breach of a contract ..... Citing 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, 388, 
anJ 9 An1. Jur., Building and Construction Contracts, 116. It 
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would seem that the provision for n damage in any manner" 
should clearly embrace damages for breach of contract. 
Words or terms appearing later in the sentence should 
not alter this clear construction when those terms are subject 
to varying connotations. Appellant cites Black's Law Dic-
tionary (3d Ed.) definition of ((reimbursement" and ((wrong" 
to show that this paragraph was meant to cover tort and not 
contract claims. While ((reimbursement" is not generally used 
in referring to rights of action for breach of contract, it does 
adequate! y describe the recovery of damages for breach of 
contract. When one party breaches a contract the other party 
suffers a legal wrong. When the injured party is awarded the 
difference between the value of the performance promised 
and the value of the performance received it can be said that 
he is being reimbursed for this legal wrong. 
Appellant states: c (The word (wrong' has been stated to 
signify, in its most usual sense, can injury committed to the 
person or property of another, or to his relative rights uncon-
nected with contract.' " Citing Black's L~w Dictionary (3d 
Ed.) page 1862, and that: n (Neglect' is ordinarily used in 
connection with tortious conduct," with no authority cited for 
this proposition (Appellant's Brief, page 7). Looking to 
Black's Law Dictionary (3d Ed.), page 1863, we find that 
((wrong," in a more extended signification, ((includes the viola-
tion of a contract, a failure by a man to perform his under-
taking or promise is a wrong or injury to him to whom it was 
made." At page 1229 ((neglect" is defined as, ((Omission or 
failure to do an act or perform a duty," and ((the term means 
to omit, as to neglect business or payment or duty or work, 
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and is generally used in this sense. It does not generally imply 
carelessness or imprudence, but simply an omission to do or 
perfonn some work, duty or act." It is submitted that appellant 
has confused the terms neglect and negligence when he states, 
'' 'Neglect' is ordinarily used in connection with tortious con-
duct." 
Thus, it can be seen that a reasonable interpretation of 
this first sentence of paragraph 15 of the contract, considering 
the definitions of the words involved, could be said to limit 
the time within which a claim may be brought for failure to 
perform the work required by the contract, or for performing 
it otherwise than as required. It is to be noted that the parties 
to the contract were not attorneys. They did not place a strict, 
legal interpretation upon the terms in their agreement. The 
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words in a contract 
is to be adhered to in construing the agreement. 9 Am. Jur., 
Building and Construction Contracts, § 8; 12 Am. Jur., Con-
tracts, § 232 et seq. ((Words chosen by the contracting parties 
should not be unnaturally forced beyond their ordinary meaning 
or given a curious, hidden sense which nothing but the exigency 
of a hard case and the ingenuity of a trained and acute mind 
can discover." 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 236. 
Looking to the manifest purpose of paragraph 15, we see 
the unreasonableness of the construction placed upon these 
\\'ords by the appellant. The paragraph limits to not later than 
the tin1e of final payn1ent in '"hich claims can be made against 
a party '" ho causes the other party any damage. This is a 
con1tnon provision in building contracts. The purpose is 
obviously to prevent the owner fron1 n1aking final payment, 
() 
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accepting the building, and then raising a claim for a defect 
which was discoverable at a time when the builder could have 
remedied the situation with ease. Constructing a building is 
a complex undertaking. Many minor discrepancies are liable 
to occur in violation of the plans and specifications. Certain 
materials may not be immediately available, whereas their 
equivalents are readily accessible. Policy and progress require 
flexibility in such situations. American courts are united in 
holding a substantial performance as being sufficient to com-
ply wit'h the terms in a building contract. Omaha v. Hammond, 
94 U.S. 98, 24 L. ed. 70; Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 
239, 129 N. E. 889, 23 A.L.R. 1429, rehearing denied in 230 
N.Y. 656, 130 N. E. 933, 23 A.L.R. 1435; Harrild v. Spokane 
School District, 112 Wash. 266, 192 P. 1, 19 A.L.R. 811. 
Paragraph 15 of appellant's brief allows an owner to 
secure adequate and reasonable performance of his plans and 
specifications, and yet prohibits him from continually harassing 
the builder, who has moved his labor and equipment on to 
new projects, with claims which should, and could, have been 
made prior to accepting the building. 
With this construction of paragraph 15 the meaning of 
the exception found in the last sentence of the paragraph is 
apparent. This exception did not broaden the meaning of 
'(wrongful act" or ((neglect." Nor did the trial court neces-
sarily look at the exception as if it had been thrown into the 
contract by someone who didn't know what was coming next, 
as appellant suggests. (Appellant's Brief, page 9.) This 
clause did except from the limitation as to when a claim may 
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be brought, any claim for faulty work or materials where the 
parties expressly stipulate otherwise. 
Appellant notes that paragraph 15 is the same as Article 
31 of the standard contract used by the American Institute 
of Architects, and contends that in the A.I.A. contract the 
paragraph has not been used to apply to faulty workmanship 
and materials. Appellant cites Article 20 of the standard con-
tract used by the American Institute of Architects to support 
this proposition. (Appellant's Brief, page 10.) Article 20 
does not necessarily support this position. No authority sup-
ports appellant's proposition. 
Respondent submits that the purpose of the exception 
clause in paragraph 15 was to except any claim for damages 
from this paragraph which would come under Article 20 of 
the A.I.A. contract. Inasmuch as Article 20 or its equivalent 
was not included in the contract under consideration, the ex-
cepting clause did not prevent claims for failures to perform 
the work required by the contract from being brought under 
paragraph 15. There are no other provisions in the contract 
between appellant and respondent relating to faulty work or 
materials. Therefore, the parties must have intended para-
graph 15 to cover claims of this nature. 
As appellant points out, the contract m question was 
Jrav"'n by a scrivener employed by appellant. (Appellant's 
Brief, page 11.) Respondent does not agree that the court 
construed "against the plaintiff." (Appellant's Brief, page 
1 1.) ,\.ppell~tnt should not be heard to question the reasonable 
construl.'tion pbH.:eJ upon the contract. The circumstances, 
\vorJs used, and positions of the parties shoVt' that the court 
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did correctly ascertain the intention and manifest assent of 
the parties. 
2. The court did not err in ruling that certain defects were 
patent and others latent. 
Appellant also contends that the court erred in ruling 
as a matter of law that certain defects were patent and others 
latent. Appellant claims he ((should have been permitted to 
show what the circumstances were and what type of inspec-
tion would have been necessary to discover the defects." 
(Appellant's Brief, page 12.) 
Appellant had two opportunities to show what the cir-
cumstances were. First, at the pre-trial conference before Judge 
Ellett, appellant was given ample opportunity, and was even 
encouraged, to come forth with sufficient information or 
evidence in order to determine the issues involved. Secondly, 
at the trial on t'he merits, appellant did rest its case without 
bringing forth any evidence whatsoever as to the circumstances 
which he now claims he was denied the right to show. In 
addition to these two opportunities, depositions were taken 
of both Mr. James Korobas and Mr. James A. Henderson 
prior to the pre-trial conference. 
At the pre-trial conference, Judge Ellett attempted to set 
forth the matters which would be in issue at the trial. The 
court made an attempt to have the circumstances brought forth, 
questioning appellant's attorney, tel suppose you have that 
information or wouldn't have put it in your cornplaint, and 
if you have it, I ought to know it now" (R. 40). When appel-
lant's attorney admitted he did not know to what extent the 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
building was not square, Judge Ellett said, ttl£ you will advise 
Mr. Bird ten days before trial the amount it is out, I will 
leave it in" (R. 41). Appellant's attorney agreed to t'his, yet 
respondent's attorney has never been advised as to this matter. 
Appellant's attorney made no attempt to offer any evidence 
or show any circumstances as to any of the claimed defects 
at the pre-trial conference. Appellant's attorney was silent 
during Judge Ellett's determination of what defects were 
and what defects were not in issue (R. 41 and 42). On page 
43, line 18 of the record, we find: 
The court: t t . . . The issues then would be to try 
those matters that I have set forth unless counsel can 
show me that the patent defects are not excluded under 
paragraph 15." 
Mr. Roe: HI want to be free to refer to the whole 
contract, of course, in so doing." 
Thus, it can be seen that appellant did have an opportunity 
to refute this narrowing of the issues, but declined to do so, 
rei ying solei y on showing that patent defects are not excluded 
under paragraph 15. 
Federal Courts operating under a similar rule providing 
for pre-trial conferences have pointed out the necessity for 
free disclosure by all of the parties if such a conference is to 
function properly. Lockwood v. Hercules Powder Co., 7 F.R.D. 
24 (D.C. Jvfo. 1947), noticed that one of the vital purposes 
of a pre-trial conference under Rule 16 is to acquaint parties 
and (Oult 'vvith real issues of fact and la\v in a case so they 
rnay be intelligently inforn1ed as to \vhat questions \vill be 
for dctern1ination at a trial on the merits. Brown v. Christman, 
10 
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126 F. 2d 625, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 203, 1942, pointed out that 
pre-trial conferences under Rule 16 reduce congestion of dock-
ets and are important to the individual litigant as reducing 
expense and delay. Appellant's attorney did not make the 
slightest effort to put forth any evidence as to the circumstances 
at the pre-trial conference. This was after taking the depo-
5itions of both parties. It therefore seems unreasonable for 
him to now tell the Supreme Court that he should have been 
permitted to show what the circumstances were. 
On November 29, 1956, the proceedings show: 
{(The Court: t(All right. Then to get this matter be-
fore the court, may it be heard at this time on the merits 
instead of tomorrow at ten o'clock?" 
Mr. Roe: Hit may, yes." 
Mr. Bird: t(Yes, that's agreeable." 
The Court: t(All right." 
Mr. Roe: rrPaintiff rests} your Honor." (R. 49 and 
50.) 
Thus, again appellant had an opportunity to show the facts, 
yet did not do so. 
It is to be noted that at the pre-trial conference appellant 
v1aived a jury trial (R. 47). Appellant had two opportunities 
to inform the court of ~he facts and circumstances of his claimed 
defects, and did not avail himself of either. He should not now 
be heard to say that he should have been permitted to show 
((the circumstances." 
We agree with appellant that under certain circutnstances 
an incorrectly sloping roof 1s no more patent that mold in 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ketchup. The court agreed with appellant. At line 26 on page 
39 of the record we find the court saying: 
(( ... that the issue would be limited to the follow-
ing matters set forth in paragraph 4 of the plaintiff's 
complaint: Whether or not the roof was faulty in con-
struction so as to cause leaking or whether the leak 
is caused by reason of conduct on the part of plaintiffs 
agents in climbing on the roof before it had settled." 
It can be seen fuat the incorrectly sloping roof was made an 
issue to be determined at a trial. In view of these facts appel-
lant cannot now contend that he should have been permitted 
to show the circumstances. He was permitted but did not 
do so. 
3. Tbe court did not err in failing to award an attorney's 
fee to plaintiff. 
Appellant contends that the court erred in failing to award 
to plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee for enforcement of the 
contract. 
Appellant made no request at the trial for an award of 
tlttorney's fee. Quite the contrary, appellant's attorney was ap-
prehensive that he was the one \vho would be required to pay 
costs (R. 49). Page 49, line 16 of the record shows: 
!vir. Roe: ult probably \\·ould. About the costs, would 
your order include that I have to pay him any costs, 
or each party bear its own, or how do you \vant to work 
that?" 
T'hc Court: "He won,t have any costs if you disrniss 
tlt)\\'. 
Mr. Bird: "Our counter claim." 
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The Court: ((Two and a half?" 
Mr. Bird: ttl don't believe we did. I don't believe 
we have." 
The Court: ((You have got a counter-claim-two and 
a half." 
Mr. Bird: ((Each party to stand its own costs, then." 
The Court: ((All right. Then to get this matter be-
fore the court, may it be heard at this time on the 
merits instead of tomorrow at ten o'clock?" 
The matter of attorney's fee was considered at the pre-
trial conference, where it was agreed that the winning party, 
((if it goes to suit," would be entitled to reasonable attorney's 
fee in the sum of Three Hundred Dollars (R. 47). The court 
requested the defendant to study the situation with regards 
to making a settlement. Defendant's attorney pointed out 
that for three hundred dollars Mr. Henderson could do some 
work towards settling unless he is awfully stubborn (R. 47). 
The tender of $137.60 made on November 29, 1956, was made, 
and was so understood by both parties, in order to a void 
having to bring the matter ((to suit." Whether this amount 
was actually due plaintiff was questionable, but defendant 
made the tender in order to avoid the possibility of having to 
pay three hundred dollars in case the matter went nto suit." 
The court did not err in refusing to award an attorney's 
fee to the plaintiff. Defendant's tender was made prior to the 
matter going oto suit." The defendant had judgment at the 
trial for no cause of action, with a direction for each party to 
bear its own costs (R. 50). It was wisdom for the court to 
let attorney's fees fall the same way. 
13 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly construed Paragraph 15 of the 
contract under consideration to apply to claims for faulty 
workmanship or materials. The court gave appellant ample 
opportunity to show the facts and circumstances as to every 
claimed defect. Appellant took depositions, had a pre-trial 
conference, a hearing before the court in settlement of the 
matter, and a trial on the merits. Appellant should therefore 
not be heard to say that he ((should have been permitted to 
show what the circumstances were." The judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS and BIRD 
Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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